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SOCIAL ACTION ORGANIZATION PARTICIPATION
AND PERSONAL CHANGE IN THE POOR:
PART II
Robert D. Herman
L.P. Cookingham Institute of Public Affairs
University of Missouri-Kansas City

ABSTRACT
In Part I (Herman, 1982) evidence bearing on the hypothesis
that participation by the poor in social action organizations
results in personal change was reviewed and found to be inconsistent and open to diverse Interpretations.
In Part I It was
observed that not all socizi action organizations are al ike and,
thus, that participation is also of varied kinds and extents and
may have different consequences for personal change.
A typology
of social action organizations forms (developed in Part I ) is
used here to comparatively classify information on organizational
characteristics and personal
change drawn from
eleven case
studIes.
The comparatIve review
leads
to three principal
implications.
First, it offers more support for the situational
than for the sub-cultural
perspective.
Second,
the review
implies that the emphasis of both perspectives on the necessity
of personality change may be inappropriate. Third, the review
suggests personal change In the poor, either dispositionally or
behaviorally, but especially the latter, Is much more likely in
those organizations in which the poor are highly included and are
sponsored by groups or Institutions with relatively few
resources.
Finally, the paper concludes with a few observations
on the meaning and significance of social action organizations of
the poor.

Jntroductioa
Anti-poverty pol icies have often been based upon (or, at
least, consistent with) the view that the poor are psychologically different than the non-poor.
Such differences have usually
been conceived as deficiencies on the part of the poor.
Additionally, some strategies to eliminate, reduce or ameliorate
poverty have proposed that participation in social action organiI
zations
would lead to beneficial changes In the personalities of
the poor.
In Part I (Herman, 1982) studies that explicitly
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addressed this participatIon hypothesis were reviewed and found
to be Inconsistent and open to a variety of interpretations.
The
term "participation" Includes a range of relationships between
the poor and an organization (from client to policy-making
member) and the poor may participate in highly different sorts of
social action organizations (from OEO-style agencies to grassroots social Influence organizations).
It seems likely that the
personal Impact of participation will be mediated by the extent
and type of participation.
In Part I a typology of social action
organizations was developed.
The typology (see Diagram I) will
be used here to comparatively review eleven case studies of the
poor's participation in social action organizations.
The tasks
of the review are to determine the positions of each organlzatlon
on the typological dimensions and to determine the extent of each
organization's impact on the poor who participated.
Diagram I

Socio-political
Change
High
Resource
Sponsor

1

2

3

4

High Inclusion
of Poor

5

6

Low

7

8

fHigh Inclusion
of Poor

J

Low

Inclusion
of

Low
Resource
Sponsor

Individual
Service

Poor

Inclusion
of Poor

The case studies vary considerably in theoretical perspectives, availability of systematically collected data, and comparabIlity and qual ity of data. This variability has precluded the
application of rigidly specified criteria.
Rather, the
comparison requires interpretation and judgment. The classification of each case study organization on the characteristics of
sponsor's resource base and organizational inclusion of the poor
are relatively simple matters. The classification of output goal
orientation and the determination of personal impact are often
more difficult.
For these reasons the classifications, and the
conclusions based upon them, must be considered as suggestive.
Chart I provides information on the case study organizatlons.
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Chart

Case

I

ResourceuBa
Iassificatiion
Inclusion

Resource

axg

Go I

Zurcher
(1970)

Topeka (Kansas)
Office of
Economic
Opportunity
Board (TOEO)

service

Iow

high

Rogler
(1972)

Hispanic
Confederation
of "Maplewood"

change

high

Iow

Gitl in
and
Hollander
(1972)

JOIN

change

high

Iow

PollInger
and
Pol linger
(1972)

se rvice
Tremont
Community
Council,
Bronx, NY (TCC)

high

Marshall
(1971)

se rvlce
Board of the
Economic and
Youth Opportunities Agency,
Los Angeles (EYOA)

low

high

Gilbert
(1970)

se rvlce
Mayor's
Conmittee on
Human Resources,
Inc., Pittsburgh
(MCHR)

low

high

Bernstein
(1971)

The Woodlawn
Organization
Youth Project,
Chicago

high

Iow

f

Po~r

gi Spo

Community Union
of Chicago

se rvlce
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Personal

1
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Chart

I

Classification of

Case Study Organizations

(cont'd)

Zimmerman
(1971)

change
Southwest
Alabama Farmer's
Cooperative
(SWAFCA)

high

low

Herman
(1976a)

"UP" of
"Delmar,"

change

high

high

NY

Herman
(1976a)

"Hope" of
"Holton,"

change

high

low

NY

University of
change
Cloomberg
and
WisconsinMilwaukee
Rosenstock
(1968)
Neighborhood
Problems Project

high

low

symbols represent the

aThe
--

*
**
***

**

**

following:

No evidence of substantial personpl impact
Evidence of change in basic personality characteristic(s)
Evidence that organizational participation required or led to
important, qualitatively different behavior from the poor.
Evidence of both personality change and behavior acquisition

Through the review and analysis of these case studies can be
only Interpretative and suggestive, the effort is justified on
First, available comparative analyses of
three related grounds.
Rose, 1972; Vanecko, 1969;
social action organizations (i.e.,
Orden, 1973; and Austin, 1972) consider only official OEO inspired and funded community action agencies. Though OEO community
action agencies differed In some ways, there are other types of
It is important to broaden the
social action organizations.
range of organizational types included in a comparative analysis.
Secondly, as implled in Part I, the effects (If any) of organizational participation on the poor may be mediated by differences
in the characteristics of the poor and by differences In the
characteristics of the organizations. The exploration of the
hypothesis that the effects of participation are mediated by
differences in the characteristics of the organizations is the
Thirdly, while both the cultural and
primary task of this study.
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situational theories of poverty imply that the personalities of
the poor "need" to be changed, this review and interpretation
will not assume that proposition to necessarily be true.
In Interpreting the personal impact of organizational participation on the poor, then, the following questions will be
crucial.
First, is there any evidence of personality change?
Secondly, is there any evidence that organizational participation
required or led to the acquisition of qualitatively different and
Important behavior(s) on the part of the poor?
Obviously, this
question will often require substantial judgment. Answers to
these questions can fall
into four classes.
There may be
evidence of change only in personality characteristics. There
may be evidence of only the acquisition of qualitatively different behavior.
Neither may have occurred.
Both may have
occurred.
To reduce, if only slightly, the faith the reader must place
in my interpretation of evidence bearing on personal change, the
following descriptions summarize the most Important evidence I
relied upon to reach the conclusions about the kind and extent of
personal impact.
The Topeka OEO Board, initiated by the Topeka Welfare Planning Council, included 24 target neighborhood representatives and
40 agency and community representatives. Zurcher (1970) found
significant changes in the poor on three (sense of mastery over
the physical and social environment, achievement orientation, and
universalistic orientation) of ten personality measures after a
year's inclusion on the board.
The non-poor did not change.
Zurcher's observation of board and organizational functioning led
him to conclude that the poor were not required to engage in new
behaviors as the Topeka OEO adopted a service strategy.
The Hispanic Confederation (Rogler, 1972) was, unlike the
Topeka OEO, an "unofficial" social action organization that a
small group of Puerto Ricans established that was intended to
help other Puerto Ricans. The organization appointed a committee
to study the educational problems of Puerto Rican children in
Maplewood; the organlzatioh Investigated the formation of a food
cooperative; and the organization visited the mayor, requesting
that the city establish an office to serve the needs of the
Puerto Rican community. The office would be controlled by the
Hispanic Confederation.
This proposal generated substantial
opposition.
Eventually a compromise was reached.
Rogler's
(1972) detailed account leads one to believe that organizational
participation had a substantial impact on the participants'
behavior. Bargaining with the mayor and social service officials
were behaviors qualitatively different than any they had engaged
in previously.
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JOIM Comrifunity Union (Gitlin and Hollander, 1970) was an
outgrowth of an SOS (Students for a Democratic Society) organizing effort and Is reported by activists In that effort.
Participants in JOIN frequently engaged in new, highly political
activities (picketing, organizing and joining in rent strikes,
and other confrontational actions). Similarly there are numerous
self-reports of value change, about race relations, fatalism and
the like:
Though the evidence Is "impressionistic," participants
in JOIN seemed much changed.
The Tremont Community Council of the Bronx (TCC) was
established by the New York City anti-poverty agency, the Council
Arguing that
Against Poverty (Poll inger and Poll Inger, 1972).
the official goal of the New York City anti-poverty program was
socio-political change, Pollinger and Pollinger (1-972) Investigated the TCC to determine to what extent that general goal was
achieved in the Tremont area. Briefly, Pollinger and Pollinger
(1972) concluded that the TCC did not function as a source of
pol Itical influence for the poor, rather it functioned as a
source of social control of the poor. Utilizing questionnaire
responses Poll inger and Poll Inger found no evidence of values or
other personality changes, but some evidence of behavior change
(e.g., participants became more active In politics and in a wider
variety of social action organizations).
The Board of the Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency of
Los Angeles (EYOA) was the official anti-poverty agency in Los
The EYOA emphasized services and serAngeles (Marshall, 1971).
Utilizing questionnaire responses Marshall
vices coordination.
(1971) found no change in feel Ings of political efficacy or In
feelings of militancy on the part of the poor representives on
the EYOA board, though there was some evidence that they believed
they now participated in more organizations than previously.
However, such changes were matters of sl Ight increases rather
than a qualitative shift.
The Mayor's Committee on Human Resources, Inc. was
Gilbert's (1970)
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania's official OEO agency.
account of this organization examines Its creation by social work
professionals, the early and unchanging goal of providing and
coordinating social services, and the extent to which neighborhood council board members were demographically representative of
poverty neighborhood residents. While Gilbert dld not collect
evidence directly relevant to the personal Impact of participation, the indirect evidence suggests that the more educated and
more politically active neighborhood residents participated and
that there was no personality or behavioral change among them.
The Woodlawn Organization Youth Project was a temporary
organization created on Chicago's South Side by The Woodlawn
Organization (TWO), an early Saul Alinsky assisted community
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organization, and two youth gangs, the Blackstone Rangers and the
East Side Disciples (Bernstein, 1971).
TWO received a contract
from the national OEO office to provide a job training program
The gangs were involved In planning and
for unemployed youth.
designing the training program and many of their members or
would-be members later received job training.
Though a University of Chicago evaluation concluded that the job training
program was fairly successful, opposition from powerful political
forces (including then Mayor Daley, the city's official antipoverty agency, and the Chicago Commission on Youth Welfare)
resulted in a refunding application being turned down.
Though
successful in providing a service, there is no evidence that the
TWO Youth Project affected the personal ities or behavior of the
youth gang members.
The Southwest Alabama Farmer's Cooperative was a small
producer cooperative of black farmers In ten Alabama counties
With some technical assistance from the
(Zimmerman, 1971).
Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the Cooperative
League, the SWAFCA was established in 1966 and had over eight
hundred members by early 1967.
Though the SWAFCA's goals were
the economic goals characteristic of other farm cooperatives,
achieving those goals had very Important characteristics for the
socio-political structure in southwest Alabama.
Zimmerman's
(1971: 146) description of agricultural institutions and relations prior to the cooperative puts the situation clearly.
Before the cooperative, the economic situation of black
farmers In southwest Alabama looked hopeless.
For the
most part, they grew cotton and corn.
Some owned their
land; most were tenants. Virtually all were tied to
whites by their need for credit at the beginning of
each year to buy food, seed and fertilizer In return
for handing over the crops they produced each fall.
The loans were of goods in kind marked up to unreasonably high prices.
No cash changed hands. For the few
who escaped the credit bind, there was still no open
market.
The black farmer dealt with the white man In
control of his area.
He bought or borrowed far above
retail and sold wholesale according to the artificial
price structure of monopoly markets.
While there is no evidence of changes in SWAFCA member's
personalities,
It Is clear that there were dramatic differences
In their behavior.
Participating In the cooperative required
many to take substantial risks and commit themselves to an
uncertain venture.
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UP was a social action organization created as a result of a
training program undertaken by extension personnel at an eastern
Over its short life UP unsuccessuniversity (Herman, 1976a).
fully pursued goals of improving housing for the poor and estabMembers of UP showed no
lishing a food-buying cooperative.
social control
or traditional
in personal
control,
changes
Nor was there any evidence that
control beliefs (Herman, 1976b).
UP participants acquired new, qualitatively different behaviors.
HOPE was a social action organization created by grass-roots
HOPE
organizing in an upstate New York city (Herman, 1976a).
conducted a successful voter registration drive in the city's
black and Puerto Rican neighborhoods, and opposed building addisingle site public housing directly adjacent to the
tional
existing public housing project. HOPE, however, failed to convince the city to build single dwelling, scattered-site public
housing.
Members of HOPE showed no measurable changes in control
beliefs, but many members did engage in behaviors (e.g. confronting city housing inspectors and landlords, meeting with and
making demands of housing authority and city officials, and
publicly demonstrating their views through picketing and sit-ins)
new to them and that demanded much (Herman, 1976a; 1976b).
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Neighborhood Problems
Project (Bloomberg and Rosenstock, 1968) were temporary social
action organizations that resulted from community organizing
projects sponsored by the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. The
first organizing project carried out a successful voter registration drive, and participants in the UWM project were important
members of separate social action organizations that produced a
A
housing rehabilitation program and a summer jobs program.
second UWN community organizing project led to successful "direct
action" efforts to have a school-crossing traffic light
installed, a pedestrian overpass constructed, and an education
Bloomberg and Rosenstock (1968) did not collect eviprogram.
Their report
dence on personality change In the UWM projects.
does suggest that many of the participants engaged In behaviors
new to them.

Though the positioning of the case study organizations In
the typology is not without some discontinuities, the patterning
does strongly imply that type 5 organizations (social action
organizations that are oriented, to some degree, toward sociopolitical change, that are sponsored by groups with comparatively
few resources, and in which the poor participate at a high level)
have had the clearest and most consistent personal impact on the
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poor (see Table I). Most of the studies of those (type 5) organizations provided no systematic evidence on the personality
change issue at all.
It is, thus, possible that members of those
organizations may also have undergone personality change as well,
although In the case of HOPE, and to a lesser extent the Hispanic
Confederation, there is some evidence that suggests that they did
not.
The only solid evidence of personality change occurring in
other (non-type 5) organizations is the Topeka Office of Economic
Opportunity case. 4 While it is, of course, impossible to prove
that personality change did not take place in the other organizations, there Is no reason to suppose that personal ity change
occurred. Further, there are even stronger reasons to believe
that (excepting the TCC) the non-type 5 organizations did not
require or lead the poor who participated In them to acquire
important new behaviors.
As was noted earlier, the distinction between a sociopolitical change orientation and an Individual service orientation is often difficult to make, and such classification often
obscures the varied, mixed nature of the activities and goal
orientations of many social action organizations.
Except In the
case of the TCC, all of the organizations that required or led to
important, qualitatively different behavior from the poor have
been classed as oriented toward soclo-political change.
This
suggests that the goal orientation dimension may not be as Important as often assumed. Perhaps sponsorship and inclusion of the
poor are more important. Table II explores this possibility.
There Is no appreciable difference in the patterning of Table II
as compared to Table I, lending further support to the view that
Inclusion and sponsorship affect the personal Impact of the
participation of the poor. One can further speculate that high
resource sponsors are reluctant or unable (for legal or other
reasons) to turn an organization over to the poor. Since the
participating poor are unlikely (though the Topeka case shows it
not impossible) to be personally affected by their experience in
anti-poverty or social action organizations unless they are in
substantial control of the organization, it seems reasonable to
conclude that governmentally-sponsored social action organizations have not been, nor are they likely to be, the most effective means of changing or mobilizing the poor.
The empirical patterns In Tables I and II have two important
implications for the principal contemporary theories of poverty.
Neither the situational nor the subcultural theory contains an
unambiguous, consistent prescription for the design of social
action organizations.
The subcultural theory Implies little
about anti-poverty or social action organization design, except
for limiting the poor to client-level participation.
Tho situational theory strongly Implies organizations with high inclusion
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Ilah b I
Position of Case Study Organizations In Typology

GoQAL Or len±tLiongj
Socio-political
change

Ind Ivi duFl
service

Hi gh

Resource
Sponsor

High
Inclusion of poor
Low
Resource
Sponsor

Key:

-No evidence of substantial personal impact
in basic personality
of change
*Evidence
characteristic(s)
**Evidence that organizational participation required
or led to important, qualitatively different
behavior from the poor
***Evidence of both personal Ity change and behavior
acquisition
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Position of Case Study Organizations when Classified
a
by Sponsorship and Inclusion Dimensions
Inclusion

of

Poor

UWM**

SWAFCA**

Hlsp. C.**

JOIN***

HOPE**
TWOSponsor's
Resource
Base

TCC**
High-

Youth Project
Low

TOEO*

EYOAMCHR-

KEY:

Same as Table I

a The organizations are placed here In a manner that rtQiUhJ
indicates differentiation within a given cell, as well as
between cells.

of

the

poor,

though

additional

structural

prescriptions

are

vague.
The comparative review of the case study organizations
offers more support for the situational prescription than It does
impact
Instances of personal
prescription.
for the subcultural
and of more important Impact are concentrated In the organizatheory and inconsistent with
tions consistent with situational
In this first Implication for theories of
subcultural theory.
poverty, support for the situational theory, this research Is
For example, research by
similar to other research on poverty.
Coward g± Q_. (1974) on the characteristics of the poor and the
non-poor in a community survey, by Placek and Hendershot (1974)
welfare
on family
planning and contraceptive practices of
mothers, by Berger and Simon (1974) on socialization practices of
black families, and by Davidson and Gaitz (1974) on the work
habits and attitudes of the poor and non-poor all support the
situational theory and contradict the subcultural theory.
The second major implication of this analysis for theories
of poverty calls the heavy emphasis on personality change Into
As noted earlier, those situationalists who have conquestion.
the
poor have
participation of
sidered the organizational
stressed the need for personality change, although none have been
very precise in defining and detailing what is meant by that
If the argument Is that effective participation by the
term.
poor cannot be achieved without concommitant change In the poor's
basic personality system, the comparative review presented here
If the argument Is that social
offers little support for it.
action organizations must present the poor with the opportunity
and the requirement that they engage In behaviors not usually
It further
available to them, then this review supports It.
Is that an organization's
Is
Important
suggests that what
sponsors and participants ng± create an organization with the
This most
view that the personalities of the poor need changing.
often happens when the poor are both Involved in creating and
directing the organization.
These implications, support for the situational view and deemphasis on personality change as an outcome of effective partipoverty may not be generally
for a theory of
cipation,
applicable. As noted earlier the organizationally active poor
Social
often differ from the less active and inactive poor.
action organizations, of whatever structure, do not recruit or
The subcultural view, though suffering
attract all of the poor.
from a number of empirical disconfirmations, may account for the
Lewis (1968: 11) once
behavior of some proportlon of the poor.
estimated that proportion: "My rough guess would be that only
about 20 percent of the population below the poverty line in the
United States have characteristics which would justify classiIf so,
fying their way of Iife as that of a culture of poverty."
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then social organizations that attempt to resocial Ize the poor
may still be necessary and sometimes effective, as the Topeka
Office of Economic Board was.
This analysis of the structure of
social action organizations and the poor's experience in them
cannot, and should not, be overgeneral Ized.
This entire paper,
throughout, has argued that theory and research on poverty, antipoverty and social action organizations, and the participation of
the poor recognize contingent relationships and search for mediating personality and organizational variables.
Closely following from the foregoing considerations Is this
review's chief Impl icatlon for research and theorizing on the
personal impact of organizational participation by the poor.
Both earlier research and the case studies reviewed here undermine any unconditional participation hypothesis.
Research on the
organizational participation of the poor can no longer assume
that all of the poor need or will undergo personality change.
Whether the poor need to be changed is certainly debatable;
whether, in any particular case, they are likely to be depends at
a minimum on the relation between the characteristics of the
participating poor and the structural characteristics of the
organization.

Though poverty and anti-poverty strategies are not currently
important policy issues, it is not because poverty in the United
States has been eliminated.
It may not be long before questions
about anti-poverty strategies are again raised - either by
governmental policy-makers or by a voluntary organizations.
In
any case important questions about the social action organizations approach to reducing poverty remain.
Can such organizations be an effective means of reducing or eliminating poverty?
Before we can begin to answer this question a prior question must
be considered.
Is poverty primarily an economic or political
phenomenon?
The nature and causes of poverty have long been debated and
I do not propose to review the debate.
I do want to observe that
most parties to the debate assume that there is not only a distinction between the economic realm and the political realm, but
that economic events, activities and issues are (and should be),
, different than political events, activities and
In
Issues.
The pervasiveness of this assumption Is one of the
triumphs of capitalism.
I have become persuaded that the economic and the politlcal are, if not exactly the same thing, very
closely Intertwined.

One of the consequences of the assumed essential difference
between the economic and the political has been that social
action organizations of the poor (both official "War on Poverty"
and independent organizations) have often been thought to be
Because the distribution of income and the
economic instruments.
proportion of the population classified as poor (using a relative
not absolute measure) did not appreciably change during the "War
there is a
on Poverty" years (Plotnick and Skidmore, 1975),
If
widespread consensus that the "War on Poverty" was a failure.
we think of the "War" as a set of programs intended to change the
skills or labor market position of the poor and/or to reform
economic practices and institutlons, such a conclusion raust, by
large,
be accepted.
But,
If
we (following Piven and
and
Cloward, 1971) think of the "War" as Initially a political strategy for maintaining the electoral support of Inner city blacks
and poor for the Democratic party and subsequently as a strategy
employed by local political establishments to blunt and co-opt
the political demands and incipient political mobilization of
these collectivitles, we must conclude that the "War" was a
success (for some).
Though it may be true that the official "War on Poverty" and
its community action agencies failed to change the economic
conditions of the poor and succeeded in maintaining the boundaries and stability of the contemporary national political system
and of local pal itical systems, what did independent social
More Importantly, what is the
action organizations accomplish?
It is, of course,
meaning and significance of their existence?
impossible to offer any well-documented, conclusive assessment of
the accomplishments of Independent social action organizations.
Some of these organizations have apparently had limited, local
effects on economic practices and the economic situation of some
To suppose that
of the poor.
We can expect no more than that.
the nation's pol Itical economy and Its mechanisms for distributing income can be changed by relatively small, resourceimpoverished, locally-oriented groups represents, It seems to me,
a serious misunderstanding of the nature of political and economThis is not to deny the strategic
ic power in the United States.
utility of economic goals for such organizations, since such
goals are often the best means for organizing the poor on their
The poor, however, cannot directly effect the extent
own behalf.
We will miss the sociological
or causes of poverty themselves.
meaning and significance of social action organizations If we
think of them as primarily efforts at economic self-help.
As two relatively recent studies (Lamb, 1975; Fainstein and
Fainstein, 1974) emphasize, the existence and fate of soc il
action organizations of the poor constitute important c- idence
about the operation of pluralist democracy in the United States.

A number of authors have built a convincing case that the Ameripluralism
1i~ini
can system of democratic pluralism is one of
and that the poor are the major collectivity excluded from full
participation in the system (for theoretical summaries see Bachrach, 1967 and Gamson, 1968; for empirical evidence see Hamilton,
All social action organizatlons of the
1972 and Gamson, 1975).
poor are potentially challenging groups (in Gamson's terms).
Because of their pattern of sponsorship and internal control,
independent social action organizations are particularly lIkely
to become attempts by the poor to gain increased admittance to
the local political system.
The evidence on the extent to which organizations of the
poor penetrated local political systems is mixed and sparse.
Lamb (1975), for instance, In a study of 100 poor neighborhoods
(not organizations) finds that the majority were not highly
However, he does find that m Iitant (as measured by
mobilized.
such activities as sit-ins, boycotts, demonstrations and mass
marches) mobilized neighborhoods have achieved greater degrees of
change in local institutions such as private welfare agencies,
local schools, and employers than other types of poor neighborBased upon a qualitative interpretation of recent urban
hoods.
political movements (meaning politicized organizations of blacks,
Latins and other non-whites) Fainstein and Fainstein (1974: 235)
conclude:
These movements cannot by called a success.
Many of them have not been able to withstand internal disaffection or diversion from their stated
goals.
Externally they have largely not managed to
The
Issues for broader purposes.
exploit local
of
urban
weakness
numerical
and
pol itical
minorities has caused them to concentrate their
Here the need to appeal
demands on local targets.
to followers on the basis of narrowly defined
Issues has resulted in movements oriented toward
Withln the lImits of this
highly specific goals.
Most
arena, however, they have made some gains.
Important, they have assisted in forcing local
consider conto
institutions
governmental
stituencies which they have previously Ignored, and
this consideration has resulted In an improvement
in public services in some Instances and, at least,
the halting of such policies as Indiscriminate
urban renewal.
In short, what evidence is available suggests that most of the
poor have not been members of social action organizations or
otherwise politically mobilized and that many (most?) social
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action organizations have not managed to fully enter local
political systems, though they have sometimes achieved some
If this Is a reasonably
important changes in local institutions.
accurate conclusion, why have social action organizations not
been more offective political instruments?
One (once?) prominent view holds that the poor have not
succeeded, and cannot, In developing stable and effective social
action organizations because they are psychologically Incapable
I concede that not all of the
I believe otherwise.
of doing so.
poor are equally capable of effectively participating, which is
also true, no doubt, at other levels in the stratification
system. The evidence reviewed here as well as other evidence
(Fainstein and Fainstein, 1974; Lamb, 1975) supports the presumption that the poor can effectively participate in purposive
social action organizations when opportunities to do so are
available. That more of the poor do not participate in social
As Olson
action organizations is due to a lack of resources.
(1965) and, more recently, Gamson (1975) have demonstrated, there
The poor have few,
is nothing "natural" about collective action.
if any, resources to spare for such risky endeavors. They are
Several
not completely unwillling to take such chances, however.
of the case studies show that the poor are especially likely to
participate (and invest resources) in social action organizations
when others have provided the initial investment and thus a
promising opportunity. That many social action organizations
have not been especially politically effective is due to the
formidable obstacles any challenging group faces.

Notes
1. Social action organizations, as defined in Part I, are those
organizations, regardless of whether they are governmentally or
privately sponsored, in which the poor participate to some extent
and which are oriented to either changing the skills, attitudes
or personalities of the poor or to achieving socio-political
change, or both.
2. Because It would result In a very lengthy paper I have not
included descriptions of the case'study organizations. Those
interested in a more extensive documentation of the cases may
either write me for a detailed consideration of each case or turn
to the original reports. Additionally, I want to be as straightforward as possible about the extent of Interpretation involved
in this paper. The comparative review rests upon two levels of
Though some of the studies (e.g. Zurcher, 1970;
interpretation.
and Bloomberg and Rosenstock, 1968) present original quantitative
data, most represent the author's interpretation of qualitative
data. On top of those interpretations rest my interpretations
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about the structure of the organization and the kind and extent
of personal
Impact.
Though it has long been commonplace to
recognize that data "do not speak for themselves," the gap between data and interpretation here is larger than Is the case in
more "rigorous" sociological research. Obviously, I do not believe this larger gap invalidates this kind of project.
That
only one person has reviewed and interpreted the case studies
raises questions about the extent to which Interpretations may be
biased In support of a given hypothesis.
Though I began with no
explicit hypotheses and though I have tried to apply the same
criteria in the same way throughout, the possibility of bias or
selectivity (though unintended) Is, Indeed, there.
Some may feel
that the use of uninformed coders working from a set of operational coding guidelines would have reduced the chance of bias or
selectivity.
Perhaps so.
Such a procedure would certainly have
given the research a more scientific aura. Besides lacking the
resources to undertake that procedure, I think the use of a
single, informed interpreter Is, In the present circumstances,
defensible and desirable.
This project is one Interpretation of
the personal impact of the poor's participation in social action
organizations -- no more, and no less.
3. For those interested in the psychological assumptions upon
which this interpretive scheme rests, let me state that I do not
believe that any and every behavioral acquisition must be preceded (or succeeded) by a change In basic personality characterIstics.
Though the four-fold interpretation to be used here Is
consistent with either behavioristic or cognitive paradigms, I
prefer the cognitive approach.
I conceive the pursuit of new
behaviors by the poor without apparent personality change as an
instance of the
theory of motivation, In which a
person's actions are regarded as determined by outcome preferences, expectancies linking efforts and performances, and expectancies linking performances and outcomes.
Though expectancy
theory has been developed by those Interested In work behavior,
it is equally applicable to "voluntary" behavior.
For major
statements about expectancy theory see Vroom (1964) and Porter
and Lawler (1968).
4. Louis Zurcher has informed me, In a personal communication,
that those who participated, and experienced personality change,
had fairly significant roles (high inclusion) in the TOEO.
He
suggests that the TOEO case is not inconsistent with Interpretation advanced here.
5. See the papers in Haveman (1977) for
evaluations of the
various component programs of the War on Poverty.
Some of the
authors In the Haveman (1977) collection do not entirely agree
with the view that the war was a failure.
For Instance, Haveman
(1977:
9) concludes that:
"A reasonable appraisal of the results

While the
of the War on Poverty might, however, run as follows:
_L[r g.rt contribution of the War to raising the income of the poor
does not appear to have been great, the total effect of that
The
effort on poverty reduction may have been substantial.
extent of a favorable judgment rests on how one interprets subtle
and indirect evidence regarding the causes of the unexpected and
unplanned [federal policy] developments, in particular their
dependence on the announcement of a War on Poverty and the implementation of its programs."
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